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Introduction
It is now recognised that industrial clusters – or concentrations of pro-duction industries of the same sector in the same area – have played aparticularly significant part in the prodigious economic transformations
that China has been through over the past 30 years. This intense develop-
ment of specialised industries in specific areas has taken place with force
and at speed, employing approaches that have, in many respects, been sur-
prising and diversified, and the importance of which has not always been
clearly anticipated.
Although it is Professor Fei Xiaotong who, by forging the concept of
“parceled economies” (kuaizhuang jingji 块状经济) in his work on the indus-
trialisation of the countryside in Zhejiang Province at the start of the 1980s,
can be credited as the first to identify the phenomenon of clusters, it was
not until after 2000 that researchers truly started to grasp the concept and
analyse it in all its diversity. Since the emergence of works from geographers,
including Professor Wang Jici’s compendium, (1) economists and sociologists
from Sun Yat-Sen University, (2) and economists and managers from Zhejiang
University, (3) to cite but a few, there has been no let-up in the growth in the
number of studies, symposiums, and research websites focusing on industrial
clusters, and with the central government introducing a cluster policy ex-
tending to other territories, including the provinces in western China, research
in this field has intensified still further. (4)
These early studies sought, above all, to explain the expansion of the phe-
nomenon. Indeed, a quarter of the 404 administrative cities on the Pearl
River Delta in Guangdong Province were clusters built around specialised
activities, while Zhejiang Province was home to more than 300 specialised
areas, some of which now occupy leading positions in international markets. 
This research also showed the diversity of the industrial clusters:
• the diversity of structures, first and foremost, since clusters of traditional
industrial firms (textiles, clothing, shoes, metal working, etc.) should be
distinguished from high-tech clusters, which in turn differ from clusters
arising from investment by foreign companies, or clusters of SMEs gath-
ered around large companies; (5)
• there are also considerable disparities between the different provinces.
For example, the dynamic of the clusters of Guangdong, which are driven
in particular by the proximity of Hong Kong and more exogenous currents
of investment and economic development, should not be confused with
that of areas where a more strictly local and endogenous form of devel-
opment holds sway, such as that observed in Jiangsu or Zhejiang Province,
for example. (6)
The latter province, moreover, experienced development on a level pre-
viously relatively unseen, and which led to certain researchers drawing
comparisons with the growth of Italian industrial districts in Europe in
the 1960s, both in terms of form – given the concentration of SMEs in
the same sectors of activity – and scale: despite being relatively deprived
and lacking in major economic assets, Zhejiang rose in the GNP ranking
of Chinese provinces from 12th place in 1978 to 4th in 2000, (7) owing to
its system of industrial districts, which the Chinese government wishes
to roll out to other more disadvantaged regions of the country. As a result
of its mainly endogenous development, and its very high concentration
of private companies (82.8% of the provincial industrial infrastructure in
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2012, a very high proportion being SMEs), (8) Zhejiang Province appears
to be one of China’s most remarkable models for development and tran-
sition to a market economy, the steps and characteristics of which have
been described exhaustively:
• firstly, the re-emergence in the villages and townships of the province,
during the 1980s, of a whole series of activities, initially small-scale and
later industrial, becoming increasingly specialised in nature; 
• a high degree of specialisation of areas into clusters during the 1990s
and until the early 2000s, in terms of both production and marketing ac-
tivities;
• the development and extension, during the first decade of the 2000s, of
new models of clusters centred on new energies and new technologies. 
This model of change could seem quite ordinary if it were not marked by
major particularities (9) such as those observed in the city of Wenzhou, which
is often held up as a leading example owing to the standing and dynamism
of its family-owned and private SMEs, or Yiwu, which has now become a
city of international trade and a market for wholesale products on a scale
seen nowhere else in the world. (10)
In addition to these essential economic approaches, it was also neces-
sary to understand the form taken by the cluster phenomenon. How was
it possible, in mainly agricultural areas of a rural/socialist character and
with no strong industrial tradition, for highly structured centres to form
in such a short time around specific operations or specialised branches of
activity? How was it possible, in the regions of this province most lacking
in industrial activity, for areas with low levels of industrial activity to grow
within the space of 30 years into centres highly specialised in areas of
production and not only selling in China but also exporting to interna-
tional markets? What economic, but also political and social approaches,
made these changes possible? What forms of governance enabled, sup-
ported, or helped shape the construction of these local organisation sys-
tems that we refer to as clusters and that constitute one of the
characteristics of Zhejiang?
These questions cannot be answered merely by examining global or gen-
eral considerations. For this reason, we have chosen to consider the subject
in the context of a case study of Yongkang, a county-level city located in
the centre of Zhejiang, which in 2010 had a population of 868,200, of
whom 300,000 were migrants. 
Yongkang has experienced an impressive level of growth over a 30-
year period. For many years, metal working existed alongside agriculture
as a traditional economic activity in this former rural county. (11) The city
later became specialised in small metal products before expanding into
the production of larger-scale products such as metal doors (70% of
China’s national production in 2012), (12) bicycles, motorbikes, and motor
vehicle parts. Since 2008, it has also been producing electric vehicles
and solar panels. This text looks at the various steps that have marked
the development of the city of Yongkang, from farm tools to electric
cars, since the launch of the economic reforms. In doing so, we will try
to examine the factors and agents that have influenced these transfor-
mations, and in particular the ways in which the various levels of gov-
ernment, whether central or provincial, and more locally at the county,
township, and town level, have been involved in the governance of the
clusters in each period. 
At each stage, we will see how public intervention practices are in a
state of constant transformation, and the modes of governance evolv-
ing. Understanding these factors should then make it possible to better
grasp the turning point that Yongkang is experiencing, along with all of
Zhejiang Province, and at the same time expand the ways in which we
understand the functioning and variety of the different industrial clus-
ters in China. (13)
The melting pot for early activities and the
emergence of small-scale workshops in the
1980s 
A base of traditional craft industry and peddling 
Yongkang is known for its tradition of small-scale metal production, which
some have claimed dates back to the fifth century BC. For many years,
metal products were manufactured in Yongkang for everyday or farming
purposes, for example scales, cooking pots, knives, sickles, and axes. (14) Two
types of craftsmen lived in this rural area: sedentary craftsmen, who
switched between agricultural activities and small-scale metal activities,
and peddling craftsmen. The latter, referred to as “door-to-door salesman”
(xingdan行担), traveled the neighbouring regions and spend at least half of
the year away from their villages in order to manufacture or repair farm
tools or articles for everyday use.
At the start of the 1950s, Yongkang had more than 40,000 registered peas-
ants also working as pedlars, accounting for 15% of the total population of
the county. (15) After the “socialist transformation” political campaign (shehui
zhuyi gaizao 社会主义改造), which involved transforming the small-scale
private operations of peasants into collective operations, independent
craftsmen were all integrated into collective factories or state factories. In
1955, as part of the first five-year plan launched two years earlier, all eco-
nomic activities of a private nature were dismantled. In response to the gen-
eral industrialisation policy of the central government, the traditional
craftsmen of Yongkang were grouped together into cooperatives in order to
provide spare parts to the few state factories, including the tractor factory,
which was the largest in Yongkang. However, most of these cooperatives
did not survive following the policy of readjustment announced by the cen-
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tral authorities in 1960. (16) It was not until 1969 that the collective produc-
tion workshops (shedui qiye 社队企业) reemerged. In 1978, there were ap-
proximately 1,000 of them in Yongkang. (17)
Parallel to this, and from the middle of the 1970s, although still strongly
opposed by those with political power who objected to their private nature,
peddling activities resurfaced, driven by poverty. Pedlars travelled through-
out China to sell their traditional craft products, returning to their villages
with information on the needs of external markets, which encouraged peas-
ant families to embark on small-scale manufacturing in an attempt to meet
these needs. The setting up of the household-responsibility system in 1978
was a pivotal event in the economic expansion of these activities. 
The conflictual emergence, “under local cover,” of
individual family businesses
At the beginning of the 1980s, soon after economic reforms had been
launched in rural China, peasants in Yongkang took advantage of the
changes to swiftly develop their additional economic activities. Indeed, in
1981, workers were authorised by the central government to declare “indi-
vidual businessman” status (getihu 个体户), provided they employed fewer
than seven people. (18) However, the creation of private companies (of more
than eight people) was still not encouraged. 
Economic life in rural areas was then supposed to be organised around a
collective system called collective production workshops (shedui qiye),
which were the property of the local governments. The latter, out of political
precaution and most probably also as a result of economic considerations,
intensified their watchful eye over private economic activities, occasionally
repressing them, as in the case of the village of Mantang in Yongkang. From
the start of the economic reform, the peasants of Mantang had secretly en-
gaged in small scale and commercial activities to sell their metal products
in the village, district, and indeed province, as well as in neighbouring re-
gions. So as to “cut off the capitalist tails” (ge zibenzhuyi de weiba割资本
主义的尾巴) – as stated by the slogan of the time – the village managers
arrested villagers who were carrying out manufacturing operations (approx-
imately 80 arrests were made) and threatened to exclude them from the
village.
This event triggered the transformations that were to follow. With a revolt
brewing, the local government was obliged to change its tone and adopt a
compromise. It agreed to turn a blind eye to the setting up of small-scale
operations, on condition that they prosper under its cover. In this context,
the local government ultimately encouraged the peasants to create family
workshops in Mantang. Therefore, in 1982, no fewer than 170 of the 183
households in the village were registered as small-scale workshops, (19) which
was a first step in the development of traditional activities in the form of
individual family businesses, aptly summed up by the slogan: “A workshop
for each family, and companies in every village” (jiajia ban gongchang, cun-
cun ban qiye家家办工厂，村村办企业). (20)
Workshops specialised in small scale metal working 
The only major industrial activity in the area was a state factory manu-
facturing tractors. Small-scale activities developed mainly in areas of indus-
try based on metal work (production of forks, cutlery, small tools, etc.) that
was carried out, in particular, using metal scrap and junk from the main fac-
tory, as well as scrap found elsewhere. 
The owner of a company producing vacuum flasks in Yongkang describes
below how he started out, with a story fairly typical of the paths followed
by other craftsmen:
In 1980, I left for Guizhou, Sichuan, Anhui, Shaanxi, etc. These are
regions where heavy industry had a major presence. I worked alone
to collect metal from factories, transporting the metal off-cuts by
train or lorry. I sold them in the village, pocketing the difference. I
did that until 1984, by which time I’d been able to earn some
money. I thought it made more sense to invest in industry than to
merely do business as a middleman. In 1985, I created a workshop,
which was officially affiliated with a collective factory. I used the
name of this factory to keep under the cover of the “red hat” 
(hong maozi 红帽子). (21)
One day, a friend received an urgent order. He needed to manufac-
ture spare fan parts from aluminium, but was unable to do so be-
cause he had no aluminium. Yet I had aluminium in stock. This friend
proposed that I take on the order. We used basic and traditional man-
ufacturing methods. There was no need for any complicated techni-
cal skills. After this first order, I entered this activity. I found a factory
I could collaborate with in Anhui. (22)
This period, which saw the emergence of early small-scale activities that
were more or less tolerated or “covered” by the local authorities, saw the de-
velopment of a certain concentration of family workshops in villages and
townships characterised by a degree of specialisation in terms of the goods
produced. In the words of a slogan that emerged at the time, this translated
into “one product per town and one sector per township” (yizhen yipin, 
yixiang yiye 一镇一品,一乡一业). This system developed to the point that
by the middle of the 1980s, 80 villages specialised in this way (zhuanye cun
专业村) had developed in Yongkang, including Mantang 墁塘, where 90% of
the family workshops specialised in the production of spare parts for scales.
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The negotiated establishment of a first more or less
improvised system of local economic organisation
In this phase of emergence, the family workshops soon came up against
major difficulties owing to the fact that the environment in which they op-
erated suffered from a total lack of official economic organisation. It is im-
portant to understand that at this time, no system existed locally allowing
independent small-scale companies to process such basic management op-
erations as billing for a product, opening a bank account, paying employees,
etc. 
Starting in 1982-83, the village of Mantang therefore began to make
arrangements to deal with these problems by local consultation. It first cre-
ated a kind of confederation between the craftsmen and village authorities,
bringing together all of the family workshops in the village with an official
appointed by the village and responsible for all the administrative and fi-
nancial steps taken by the workshops. It even developed a system of pay-
ments in order to fund shared services while also ensuring the approval of
local governments: a bona fide tax system was negotiated, under which 1%
of the total of sales would be paid to the commune, 3% to the village, and
5% to the state.
A former official of the Yongkang city council, who at this time kept the
log of these events, gave the following account:
In 1981, it became possible to set up as an independent businessmen
(getihu), but such entrepreneurs ran into three types of problems:
private businessmen were not able to invoice for their products, since
they lacked authorisation documents from the village; they could
not open a company bank account; and there were no regulations
concerning the payment of employees. This meant they needed to
join the collectivity. A confederation was created in order to circum-
vent these problems. Under the name of the collectivity, the peasants
could work for themselves. This system is described by an expression:
“hang the sheep’s head in order to sell dog’s meat” (guazhe yangtou
mai gourou 挂着羊头卖狗肉, which can be translated by “cry up wine
and sell vinegar”).
This was a very important model, and was christened “the model of
the three unions” (sanjiehe 三结合), which were:
• the union of families and collectivities;
• the union of collective production workshops in an economic 
• confederation;
• the union of specialised producers and services for companies.
This system proved to be effective, and even enjoyed a certain degree of
success, which helped it to grow and become more established. Indeed, it
soon attracted the attention of neighbouring communes in addition to that
of the higher political authorities, in particular those of the county of
Yongkang and the prefecture-level city of Jinhua. The government in
Yongkang legitimised the system by launching the slogan of the “Four
wheels turning together” (sige lunzi yiqi zhuan 四个轮子一起转) in 1984,
celebrating the synergy between family households, the economic confed-
eration, and village and town authorities.
Taken up and largely followed in the whole of the Yongkang area, the ex-
ample of Mantang allowed the regional economy to swiftly take off. Mean-
while, the collective production workshops (shedui qiye) transformed
themselves into rural companies (xiangzhen qiye 乡镇企业) as early as
1984. Therefore, four types of companies could be found in Yongkang by
the end of 1985: 295 rural factories affiliated with the township, 525 rural
village factories, 913 confederated factories, and 1,962 independent work-
ers. (23)
Summing up this first period in the 1980s, it can be seen that the result
of the deregulation started in 1978 by the central government, which gave
rise to a certain reduction in the forms of centralised interventionism that
had previously prevailed, was to allow the authorities at the most local lev-
els to solve their own problems within the newly introduced frameworks.
In the village of Mantang in Yongkang, this initially gave rise to a violent
confrontation between small-scale craftsmen who wished to open and de-
velop their own family workshops, and the local collectivities that intended
to prevent them from doing so, not only in the name of the principles spec-
ified by the central authorities, but also in order to safeguard their own local
system of collective companies. Having seemingly arrived at an impasse –
because it effectively paralysed an entire village – the conflict was solved
by adopting a compromise in the form of the “red hat” system, supple-
mented by a mode of local organisation that allowed private activities to
be established with a greater degree of freedom. Initially instituted locally
by the “three union model” slogan, the experiment was taken up, extended,
and legitimised at the municipal level by the city of Yongkang, celebrating
the new synergy at work between family households, the economic con-
federation, and village and town authorities.
Such was the context in which Yongkang’s local system began to take
shape following the decentralisation (difang fenquan 地方分权) and the
transition economy implemented at this time in China, (24) as the city de-
veloped its activities in the sector that it knew best: small-scale metal work-
ing.
At this initial stage, it should be noted that the economic actors and vil-
lage authorities succeeded, not without setbacks and problems, in outlining
and honing an economic model that brought the authorities in the town-
ships (xiang 乡), towns (zhen 镇), and villages (cun 村) together with the
cooperatives (lianhu 联户) and private companies. Through this system,
whose informal beginnings gave way to institutional recognition – albeit
retrospectively – a new form of governance was able to find a footing in
the local economy during this transition phase, in the form of an organisa-
tion trying to generally manage the coexistence and development of activ-
ities both public and private.
Industrial take-off and the
institutionalisation of clusters in the 1990s
and early 2000s
It was in the 1990s, and more specifically after Deng Xiaoping’s journey
to Shenzhen in 1992, when he recognised and even openly encouraged the
liberal economy in China, that a notable shift occurred, resulting in a veri-
table explosion of industrial operations. This liberalisation of the economy,
which allowed peasants and small-scale businessmen to consider setting
up their own commercial and industrial activities on the national or even
international scale, was to give free rein to the development of economic
forces that had previously been latent or had yet to take shape. There would
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be a particularly high rate of growth in Zhejiang, owing to the fledgling in-
dustries that had taken shape locally during the preceding period. 
The explosion of industrial activities in Zhejiang and
Yongkang
Between 1996 and 2004, the number of clusters in Zhejiang doubled, while
the value of their industrial production increased six-fold (see Table 1). In
2004, the 601 clusters were comprised of approximately 310,000 companies
covering the main sectors: textiles, electrical goods, industrial equipment,
metal products, electronic goods, leather, etc. Of the 90 districts and cities
in the province at the time, 82 were categorised as industrial clusters. (25)
The expansion of industrial activities in Yongkang in this period was equally
remarkable. In less than a decade, Yongkang grew to become one of the top
100 counties in China in terms of industrial production, achieving the 70th
position in 2001 and 47th in 2005. (26) As in the rest of the province, Yongkang
experienced a veritable explosion in the growth of its companies, which in-
creased their specialisation in metal working activities while also diversify-
ing their production in this sector. In 2001, more than 11,000 varieties of
metal product were registered there, approximately one hundred of which
covered a third or more of the Chinese market. (27)
This period saw a massive transformation of the family workshops, the
majority of which became full-scale companies operating in various sectors
concerned with the production of metal goods. (28) Moreover, many new
companies were created, considerably expanding and diversifying produc-
tion and allowing a move to more upmarket operations. 
In this way, Yongkang shifted from producing basic metal tools, cooking
utensils, and small household items to operations outputting greater vol-
umes of goods but also products that were technically and technologically
more complex, such as metal doors, locks, mountain bikes, cylinder heads
for engines, spare parts for motor vehicles, small motorbikes, small electrical
tools, etc. By 2004, the city’s economy was structured by seven sectors of
activity. (29)
This major development was not without its effects on forms of local gov-
ernance, especially since privatisation policies and the search for ways out
of the planned economy helped profoundly transform the context and
change the rules of the game. 
The paths of transition: Privatisation and
transformation of the statutory framework of
companies 
Owing to the reform of the legal status of companies and the privatisation
process that had been put in place, the change in the scale and level of eco-
nomic production of companies touched upon above went hand in hand
with a diversification and transformation of their legal statuses. 
Indeed, in 1994, a major process of privatising collective companies was
initiated. These companies switched from the status of collective companies
with a responsibility contract (chengbao hetong 承包合同) to that of share-
holding collective cooperatives (gufen hezuo qiye 股份合作企业). At the
end of the 1990s, the movement became more marked with the general
privatisation of companies, which became either shareholding collective
companies (gufen hezuo gongsi 股份合作公司) or limited liability compa-
nies (zeren youxian gongsi 责任有限公司). (30)
These important transformations on an economic and legal level resulted
in a deep-lying diversification of company models. Thus, in Yongkang, family
companies, collective rural companies, limited liability companies, and even
early industrial groups rubbed shoulders with each other. The local system
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Table 1 – Economic characteristics of the industrial clusters in Zhejiang (1996-2004)
Source: According to Sheng Shihao and Zheng Yanwei, “Jingzheng youshi: Zhejiang chanye jiqi yanbian he fazhan yanjiu” (Competitivities: Study on the Evolution and Develop-
ment of Industry in Zhejiang), Hangzhou, Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2009, p. 34; Shen Jianming, Xu Dake, and Lei Chaolin, “2005 nian Zhejiang kuaizhuang jingji fazhan bao-
gao” (2005 Report on the Economic Development of the Clusters in Zhejiang), 25 February 2012, www.xzbu.com/1/view-234951.htm (accessed on 13 June 2015); Zhejiang
sheng jingji maoyi weiyuanhui (Economic and Trade Commission of Zhejiang Province), “Zhejiang kuaizhuang jingji fazhan baogao” (Report on the Economic Development of
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1996 306 266 38 91 13 4
2000 519 599 49 118 26 3
2003 430 1,021 60 149 35 26
2004 601 1,582 64 202 46 37
Distribution of companies
in the clusters according to the value 
of their industrial production
was transformed at an even deeper level by the fact that, at another level,
the rules of the game opening the way to privatisation were changing. In
1995, the central authorities passed a new reform relating to the separation
between the control and management of companies (guanban fenli 管办分
离). Whereas previously, only businessmen and local economic actors had
been authorised to operate in the economy, this law allowed new actors onto
the scene. It introduced the possibility of creating private companies and in-
termediate organisations authorised to intervene in economic processes, and
made it possible to form associations of businessmen, branch associations,
chambers of commerce, etc., and legitimised their actions. At the end of the
1990s, the National Commission for economic reform (quanguo jingji tizhi
gaige weiyuanhui全国经济体制改革委员会) drove this political will to sepa-
rate the different domains still further forwards, by uncoupling the role of po-
litical power from the specifically economic sphere to an even greater degree.
Yongkang: Responses and adaptations of the modes
of public intervention
In this new context of intense economic expansion, a proliferation of com-
panies and a profound transformation of company models, local govern-
ments needed to transform their own actions, especially because these
changes went hand-in-hand with the emergence of new institutional actors,
both private and public, and the introduction of new rules governing oper-
ations between the actors. During this period, the mode of intervention
adopted by the local authorities in Yongkang moved towards playing a more
direct role in terms of providing facilities via the establishment of infra-
structure and services, making a major contribution in terms of structuring
the area and organising it into specialised clusters. These interventions
mainly involved land-use planning on a local level and the provision of fa-
cilities offering direct support to trade and innovation. 
A role in land-use planning 
Following its swift economic expansion, the city of Yongkang found itself
faced with a major problem in terms of space and infrastructure at the start
of the 1990s. Despite diversifying to a certain extent in terms of the goods
it was producing, the city’s industry was still, in effect, heavily reliant on
low-cost products (household items, small tools, etc.). The old specialised
areas of production were found to be unsuited to meeting the new demands
being made of them in terms of both capacity and quality. Moreover, many
companies left the city towards the end of the 1990s in order to expand,
most re-establishing themselves in neighbouring districts, which led to spec-
ulation and blockages. The owner of the Sunshine Company, whom we met
at the time, gave the following account:
The major problem in Yongkang is land speculation, with prices reach-
ing 3,000 or 4,000 yuan per square metre. On top of this, the city
sets quotas. Applications need to be submitted every year, and when
the quotas have been reached, it is impossible to obtain any more
land. That is why companies go elsewhere.
This situation forced the local authorities in Yongkang to react and adapt
their actions in order to better regulate the redeployment of economic ac-
tivities. This they did by creating new industrial areas. In 2009, a former of-
ficial from the Yongkang city administration described this process:
The village of Qianhuang, on the banks of the river Huaxi, started by
exploring a 59-acre plot of land near the river, in order to install
dozens of family companies there. This prompted the local authori-
ties to explore vacant land on the hills of Yongkang. The Yongkang
government subsequently built an industrial area and rented out
plots to companies. A series of industrial estates was built in this way,
hosting up to 3,800 companies at the start of the 1990s. 
It should be noted that this land-planning role was subsequently taken
up and developed by the provincial government in Zhejiang. In 1999, it de-
cided to establish new industrial estates in a more widespread manner in
the province, based on the model that had been tried and tested in the
province. Almost 100 specific industrial estates (tese gongyeyuan qu 特色
工业园区 ) and 100 specialised areas of industrial districts (xiangzhen
gongyeyuan qu 乡镇工业园区) were developed in this way in provincial ter-
ritory. (31)
A role supporting trade 
The success of the industrial clusters in Zhejiang was largely down to the
close links they were able to develop between production and marketing
activities. Indeed, certain cities in the province, such as Yiwu, set themselves
up as clusters in their own right, not to produce industrial goods, but instead
to market these produced goods throughout the province and even on a
national scale, with networks branching out into other provinces. (32) As pre-
viously noted, this was one of the main assets behind Zhejiang’s success. (33)
The local government of Yongkang followed this example on its own scale,
and even supported this movement.
Starting in the second half of the 1990s, for example, it started encour-
aging companies to strengthen their link between production and trade:
“Stimulating industry through trade and developing industry together with
trade” (yi shangcugong, gongmao liandong 以商促工，工贸联动). It also
undertook to build, with the other local actors, the Technological City of
Metals (wujin jishucheng 五金技术城), which opened in 1996. This is a spe-
cialist market bringing together producers and traders operating in the var-
ious branches of production in the area. This facility plays host to various
specialist fairs and exhibitions at both a national and international
level, (34) including, for example, a fair showcasing metal door production,
this being an important sector for Yongkang, which accounts for 80% of
metal door production in China. 
A role supporting innovation 
The other major area of intervention by the municipal authorities related
to facilities supporting innovation, for example the creation in 1999 of the
Innovation and Service Centre in Yongkang, providing a genuine service plat-
form intended for companies. This is a half-private, half-public organisation,
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50% of its resources coming from the state (the central state, the province,
and the city of Yongkang), while the remaining 50% results from activities
carried out by the centre. It acts as an intermediary between companies
and research, helping companies design products, innovate, and obtain
patents, and offering consulting services, etc. in all areas concerning the
metal industry. It has a test laboratory, and can also provide premises, al-
lowing it to play the role of a business incubator.
New socio-political mixes and new modes of
governance
Another observation that can be made of Yongkang in the 1990s is that
not only did the area of intervention of the local public authorities shift sig-
nificantly, but that the modes of intervention themselves were transformed
as well. These transformations resulted from the profound socio-political
shake-up and major public/private readjustments that were then taking
place, and that intensified under the swift economic expansion of the time. 
The deregulation and the breaking down of public/private barriers also
had a profoundly disruptive effect on the circumstances and the structures
of both public and private local actors.
Public actors
With the privatisation policy and the resulting separation between the
economic and political spheres, the local government found itself withdrawn
from the economic sphere, where it was no longer supposed to play the
leading role of a direct actor. In order to do so it would need to find other
avenues. The structure we have looked at was rather built upon a collective
management of the economic market, based on “small government and big
market” (xiao zhengfu, da shichang小政府，大市场), as summed up by the
motto promoting the changes: “The government guides, the administration
cooperates, civil society participates, and the peasants remain the hard
core” (zhengfu yindao, bumen peihe, shehui canyu, nongmin zhuti 政府引
导，部门配合，社会参与，农民主体).
In this new context, the intermediate organisations would now not only
play an economic role, but would also act as an interface in consulation
with the local authorities and under their cover. The impact in Yongkang
could be seen instantly, with management of the Technological City of Met-
als officially shifting into private hands in the form of the National Company
of the Technological Market of Metals of Yongkang (Yongkang Zhongguo
keji wujincheng youxian gongsi 永康中国科技五金城有限公司), which
brought together various public and private partners. It should nevertheless
be noted that the local government, as the main shareholder, retained a
prominent role in decisions made by the company.
Indeed, what really characterises this phase was the degree of political
and economic mixing taking place. The links between the state apparatus
and companies had never been looser. That said, they reformed and adapted
to the new private structures that were being established, with movement
taking place in both directions. Admittedly, the local government no longer
intervened directly as an entrepreneur in local economic life, but it did in-
directly regulate activity by playing a part in the various structures imple-
mented to provide support to companies, and through its continuing
management role in major operations concerning land use and services. It
also drew benefit from the indirect – though also more informal – links that
remained or were formed during this period with new businessmen from
the public sector. For example, in the major shift that took place towards
the private sector at this time in Yongkang, the new company bosses were
very often former managers of rural collective workshops, or former local
political officials, or indeed had been sales or technical managers in collec-
tive companies. (35) Additionally, when free elections were introduced in the
villages of the area, many businessmen became political leaders in the local
organisations. In 1996, 40% of positions of responsibility in the villages were
thus held by businessmen (this proportion passed 60% in 2002). (36) The
overall result was a thorough shake-up at the local level between the various
economic and political actors.
Businessmen
The position and interaction of businessmen in the local system have also
changed. The local government continues to act as a privileged collaborator
with companies, and its support is essential in order for them to prosper.
This support enables companies to obtain information and assistance more
quickly, for example when acquiring land to accommodate company ex-
pansion, and in the form of support for innovation by research centres linked
to the local government, or tax exemption. Becoming a member of various
political bodies allows private businessmen close access to political power
and to enjoy its support, thus ensuring the success of the company. It should
be noted that, on a local basis, companies in Yongkang – and without doubt
in many other cities – are judged less in terms of their performance on a
purely economic level than on their ability to pay their taxes and be in-
volved locally. It is partly on the basis of these criteria that the merit list
and ranking of companies are drawn up, forming the basis for the allocation
of assistance and services established locally. (37)
The 1990s and early 2000s therefore constituted a decisive period in
Yongkang’s development, not only because of its extraordinary economic
expansion, but also because it was during this period that the specific forms
of its organisation into an industrial cluster specialising in metal working
developed and took a clearer shape.
Therefore, within a period of ten years, a system rooted in “parcelled econ-
omy activities” that was spatially very narrow and economically limited on
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account of its small-scale nature, grew into a highly structured area capable
of standing on its own two feet and emerging as a specialised cluster. This
transformation was made possible by the evolution of the economic frame-
work. Indeed, it could not have taken place without the deep-lying changes
in modes of governance and in the new roles attributed to local govern-
ments, which uncoupled the economic and political powers, introducing
new types of mixing and interaction between public and private actors, and
other forms of local public intervention that took direct responsibility for
the facilities of the cluster, tied in with the multiple economic actors in-
volved. On the strength of these transformations, how would the new clus-
ter subsequently be able to sustain these advances? 
From industrial clusters to cluster networks:
Towards new forms of governance?
The context
In the middle of the 2000s, Yongkang therefore emerged in Zhejiang
Province as a dynamic and flourishing industrial cluster, whose activities
were both particularly well integrated locally and also open to the outside
world. In 2006, the city had more than 15,000 private registered firms, in-
cluding 83 electric tool companies, 40 involved in casting and sheet metal
forming, 50 appliance manufacturers, 45 steel plants, etc. Of the 15,000
companies, some 3,000 sold their finished products outside China, while
another 12,000 served as subcontractors, suppliers, or distributors. (38) To-
gether, they formed a dense network of companies relatively well integrated
with each other and operating according rules that, despite being more or
less unspoken, were nevertheless relatively well observed (honouring of en-
gagements, fixed production sites, and the preservation of client and sup-
plier networks). In other words, they functioned as a full-scale cluster, giving
Yongkang its competitive advantage. (39)
The period was not without its setbacks, however, and Yongkang had to
face up to a series of difficulties throughout the 2000s.
The problem of changing production demands 
The expansion of the Yongkang area and the diversification of metal pro-
duction operations were undoubtedly important, but they continued to be
too heavily reliant on low-cost products such as household items, small tools,
etc. that were manufactured in often polluting industrial sectors. The existing
clusters therefore struggled to adapt to the new demands that were being
made of them, in particular to improve the quality of their products; they
also found it difficult to comply with the new environmental requirements
introduced by the government at both the central and provincial level. 
At another level, a number of companies that were experiencing sharp growth
urgently needed to expand, but Yongkang was no longer in a position to provide
them with new land. This led many companies to leave the city at the start of
the 2000s. Some went to re-establish their operations in neighbouring counties,
while others uprooted their operations to other Chinese provinces in moves
that allowed them not only to acquire new spaces, but also to benefit from ad-
vantageous tax and duty arrangements, and indeed cheaper labour.
What is more, these problems arose at the time of the global financial
crisis of 2007-2008. The second part of the 2000s were a particularly diffi-
cult time, marked principally by flagging exports and an increase in the cost
of raw materials and labour, all of which were further exacerbated by the
financial situation. The SMEs in Zhejiang were particularly hard hit, and
whole clusters, such as those in the city of Wenzhou, were heavily affected. 
These various difficulties forced the authorities in Yongkang to implement
new forms of development and to rethink, in particular, their territorial root-
ing. The modes of intervention and governance were, for their part, pro-
foundly redefined.
Intensification and transformation of local
government actions
In this new phase, the government in Yongkang intended to play a role of
supporting and assisting companies, offering services in three main areas: (40)
the creation of specialised centres providing services to keep companies in
the area, an extension of the policy of innovation and modernisation of in-
dustry, and assistance with restructuring. The overall aim was to transform
the local framework and stage in order for companies to be able to play a
full role (the government would set the stage, and the companies would
play the roles, zhengfu datai, qiye changxi 政府搭台，企业唱戏). The result
of this policy of “upgrading” the various sectors offering companies assis-
tance and services was to open the way to another way of organising the
cluster, this time on a broader base.
The creation of specialised centres and services for
companies
In addition to the avenues previously developed to provide general support
to companies (in land-use planning and support for trade and innovation)
and without abandoning them, the city of Yongkang was able to further its
interventions by making them increasingly targeted and specialised.
For example, in 2007 it created five specialised service centres for com-
panies: a registered office centre, a fairs centre, a logistics centre, an inno-
vation and service centre, and a customs centre. In 2011, a further five
centres were being brought into existence relating to the fields of quality
control, industrial creation and design, international logistics, human re-
sources, and the more specific sector of producing industrial moulds. The
aim was to directly provide local businesses with a whole range of specialist
assistance and advice throughout the various stages involved in realising a
product, offering help on-site in terms of advice and quality.
To take one example, the registered office centre (zongbu zhongxin), built
between 2008 and 2012, was designed to accommodate more than 500
companies. It was aimed, in particular, at those companies in Yongkang that
had moved their production operations out of the city owing to an inability
to acquire land, as well as at new companies arriving from outside. The cen-
tre’s policy was also geared towards keeping companies who paid their taxes
in the city of Yongkang by offering them offices, in addition to numerous
services such as a banking, information, foreign trade, etc. 
Repositioning the channels of innovation in regional
and national policies
The main action of the municipality was to ensure that local innovation
policies fell within the scope of the major national and provincial guidelines.
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In the context of the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015), the central authorities
established a policy promoting innovation and high technology with the aim
of moving into a new phase of industrial development. In the case of Zhejiang,
the government identified three main areas in which it could face up to na-
tional and international competition: innovation, environmental protection,
and a social policy favourable to migrant workers. In terms of innovation, mov-
ing upmarket and the promotion of high technology became priorities. The
province therefore helped fund the creation of research centres and innovative
projects, identifying 42 high-technology clusters. Of the 12 priority activity
sectors defined by the central government, and the five chosen by Zhejiang
Province, Yongkang selected two: electric cars and new energies (solar and pho-
tovoltaic energy). As a result, a chain of production of electric vehicles for farm-
ers and craftsmen was set up in 2011, using Japanese technology.
With the construction of a new 10 km2 motor vehicle production area,
the city expected in 2015 to welcome five manufacturers with a total pro-
duction capacity of one million cars. (41) A subsidy was offered to innovative
companies in this sector.
Incentives for the restructuring and technical
renovation of SMEs
In order to renew the industrial infrastructure, which was still strongly
characterised by the position occupied by cheap, low-technology products,
the government of Yongkang drew up a series of measures and financial as-
sistance schemes to encourage family concerns to restructure themselves
into shareholding companies.
Similarly, as regards facilities, the local government contributed financially
to investments made by companies fitting out their premises in accordance
with new environmental standards by covering 10% of the cost of equip-
ment produced abroad, and between 4% and 6% for Chinese equipment,
depending on the sector. 
The policy of providing specialised services to companies, the desire to
modernise the local industrial infrastructure, and the wish to ensure that
local industrial activities were in line with the priority sectors chosen and
stated at the national and regional levels, were all concerns that meant that
the local authorities had transformed the organisation of the metal working
cluster of Yongkang by the early 2010s. 
Redeployment of the area on a wider base: Cluster
networks
Starting in 2007, Yongkang embarked on a new phase of its industrial de-
velopment. Aiming to channel these new changes while conserving the syn-
ergy characteristic of clusters, these new clusters, built in rural areas, were
no longer limited to a single administrative location, or to a single sector of
activity. They brought together companies with a variety of activities in an
inter-county area (kua chanye, kua xianyu 跨产业，跨县域), thus forming
new economic centres (jingji quan 经济圈) and defining new types of inter-
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county, multi-activity clusters (kua chanye kua xianyu jiqun 跨产业跨县域
集群). (42)
The newly established cluster or economic centre straddled the three ad-
ministrative units of Yongkang, Wuyi, and Jinyun. It extended over an area
of 2,000 km2, with Yongkang located at its centre, some 20 km from each
of the other two counties. Since 2001, more than 1,000 companies had set
up in these areas, and of all of the companies moving in, 62% were from
Yongkang, 20% from Wuyi, and 18% from Jinyun. (43)
The government of Yongkang therefore committed to making this area
into a model modern cluster. Selected from the 21 pilot innovation clusters
in the province, (44) the economic centre of Yongwujin 永武晋 (for Yongkang,
Wuyi, and Jinyun) would become, by 2010, the first county-level city in the
province to have completed, via the “inter-county and multi-activity” label,
its structural innovation and transformation project. (45) The new economic
centre of Yongwujin (Yongwujin chanye jiqun 永武晋产业集群) was organ-
ised into four areas (see Map 1): the economic development area of
Yongkang (Yongkang jingji kaifaqu), the new area in West Yongkang
(Yongkang cheng xi xinqu), the Wuyi economic development area (Wuyi
jingji kaifaqu), and the industrial area of the town of Huzhen (Huzhen
gongye gongnengqu), each specialising in a certain field.
The first economic and development area, in Yongkang, is the centre of
the metal industry and provides the technological linchpin. This is where
eco-friendly cars are manufactured, as well as being the site of the registered
office centre, service centres, etc. The second area is set aside for the pro-
duction of motorcycles and is more focused on subcontracting activities
(spare parts for cars, various metal products, etc.). The third area is home
to industrial estates designed specifically around flagship products. The last
area is located in a more rural setting, where industrial production is more
scattered and without any particular specialisation.
Organised into a network, these new clusters brought several existing in-
dustrial estates together (reorganised around the main linchpin of
Yongkang), technological parks and service centres. Production was to be
diversified in these new clusters, shifting from metal tools for agricultural
or household work to spare parts for motor vehicles, copper processing, the
manufacture of motorcycles and cars, etc. The new industrial areas, each
separate from the others but remaining part of the same structured net-
works, represented a new way of organising the clusters – possibly even a
new concept – attempting to supplement the initial “specialisation” of the
clusters with complementary features and openings with regard to services
and networking. Regardless of their size, companies could organise them-
selves to adapt to this new economic environment. Some did indeed read-
just their market and outlook, remaining in Yongkang to develop; (46) others
diversified their activities, or indeed their installations, (47) while yet other
developed their innovations, or created their brand and looked to the in-
ternational markets. (48)
It is, of course, too early to assess the real impact of these measures and
take stock of a policy that was, after all, introduced recently. What matters
for the purpose of this article is that, changing the scale and period, the po-
litical and economic stakes for Yongkang have been profoundly modified.
The role of the municipal authorities has also transformed, with the mode
of governance in Yongkang having extended, diversified, and shifted during
this time. 
In this most recent phase, it was no longer a case of bringing it about by
channelling and structuring an endogenous development in the manner of
the previous phase; it was rather a case of updating the former low-cost in-
frastructure and its harmful effects on the local environment, modernising
the area to bring it up to the standard required for the international markets,
and making this possible by developing innovation and new technological
sectors, while rethinking and redeploying the economic and spatial organ-
isation of the area and the old clusters on a more adequate footing. 
It would not have been possible to carry out this large-scale work without
implementing broader industrial policies. Securing the direct involvement
of the provincial and national levels and working in close collaboration with
them was crucial, if only to benefit from the effects of the major economic
strategies decided upon and driven forward by these levels, and the means
implemented in order to realise them.
The city’s actions have therefore been characterised by a system of im-
plementation better coordinated with these various external authorities
and also more incentivised with regard to the local actors. This has been
seen in the close cooperation with the state and province in order to tie in
with the development sectors successively defined by the two; greater co-
operation with other municipal and urban entities and the provincial and
national authorities in order to reorganise the whole area and establish
inter-county and multi-activity clusters; various examples of incentive aid
aimed at profoundly transforming the local company infrastructure to leave
behind the low-cost past and put in place infrastructures offering specialist
services and advice, and centres to assist research and innovation, etc. In
short, the intention was to provide a service-oriented government playing
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a major pivotal role at the various decision-making levels and adhering to
the new public intervention model advocated in present-day China (the
service government, fuwuxing zhengfu服务型政府).
Conclusion
As a major flagship of Chinese industrial development, Zhejiang presents
– through its clusters – a relatively original mode of development, differing
in its deeply endogenous character from that seen in other areas of China,
such as Guangdong, (49) as an examination of the development of the city
of Yongkang clearly shows. 
This essentially rural and relatively deprived area with no strong industrial
base has been able to set up veritable sectors of activity specialised in metal
work, to the point that it is today a relatively flourishing specialised cluster.
Over a 30-year period, it has been able to establish the channels needed to
allow its own expansion. Shifting from the small scale production of farm
tools to the construction today of electric cars, evolving from a system
rooted in “parcelled economy activities” to an organisation of “cluster net-
works,” the configurations of local industry could barely be more contrast-
ing, demonstrating a far-reaching ability to adapt, both economically and
politically, combined with a high level of institutional flexibility.
At each step, it appears that the area of Yongkang has been able to grasp
the possibilities opening up to it, whether this has meant forcing them, as
in the initial spurt of growth in the 1980s leading to the cover of the so-
called “red hat” system; fully embracing, at the time the clusters were form-
ing in the 1990s, the dynamic created by the new political and economic
shake-ups made possible locally by the introduction of laws relating to the
transition and privatisations; or indeed not being afraid to change the ap-
proach and initiate a degree of restructuring to embrace new types of ac-
tivities and new spaces, in order to face up to the globalised challenges of
the early 2000s.
This development would probably not have been possible had it not been
accompanied, on each step of the way, by a change in modes of governance.
This saw a shift from a system of authoritarian local government in the first
phase, requiring adaptation and compromise, to the second phase involving
liberalisation and privatisation in a far more direct local mode of adminis-
tration and management, in which the local collectivities and new economic
actors acted as the driving force structuring Yongkang's specialised cluster.
The desire of the area, at the start of the 2000s and faced with inevitable
globalisation, to update part of the existing industrial fabric and promote
the cluster’s industrial credentials by taking it to a new technological level,
helped modify local modes of intervention. The emphasis now shifted from
the local situation to how this situation fitted into the wider context,
whether spatial, political, or economic, where it was to evolve. Establishing
the inter-county, multi-activity cluster, and adhering to the technological
sectors promoted both nationally and regionally while updating the old in-
dustrial infrastructure, would lead to the establishment of modes of gover-
nance giving greater prominence to more indirect forms of intervention by
placing greater emphasis on incentives, global coordination, regulation, and
so on. 
Beyond the case in question, what lessons can be learned from this?
Firstly, the forms of transition observed in Yongkang between the 1980s
and 1990s bring to mind observations already made elsewhere concerning
the shift from the authoritarian forms of “local corporatist” governance (in
which the local authorities are directly involved in the collective companies,
manage their investments, rule locally by deciding everything, etc.), to forms
of intervention of a more directly managerial nature in the period of liber-
alisation of the economy, referred to as “post-local corporatism” (in which
the local collectivities are more directly involved in the management and
organisation of local development). (50)
Secondly, the observations made in Yongkang and Zhejiang most certainly
make it possible to further our understanding of the changes taking place,
as noted by other observers of development in this province. 
For the latter, the success and originality of Zhejiang’s clusters lie precisely
in the mode of management closer to the ground that developed from and
through the advent of liberalisation. Admittedly, during the 1990s, the cen-
tral government deregulated, decentralised, put in place the framework for
transition, and promoted privatisation. But while it did indeed provide an
institutional framework, these general guidelines neither provided nor con-
structed the means to progress further in terms of practical action. There
was no specific policy, for example, to assist clusters; the very term did not
emerge until the beginning of the 2000s. In this transition phase in the
1990s, each cluster therefore worked to develop in its own fashion. In Zhe-
jiang, and as we have seen in Yongkang, it was the system of locally man-
aging local policies, based on the smallest local unit, the town, that helped
build a series of diversified and adapted industrial structures, closer to the
ground and in a new kind of socio-economic mixing. It was these structures
that would give their form to the spaces later referred to more generally by
the term “clusters.” (51) A certain absence of specific intervention by the cen-
tral government in the other layers of government appears to have allowed
the local levels to model and structure themselves in the way they did, the
framework being provided by the state, but with no specific help coming
from the state. This “absence” can also be seen in the behaviour of the
provincial government, which might be considered to be “lagging behind”
somewhat at this time, following rather than leading initiatives developing
locally at the time, even if it subsequently took over operations that proved
successful, as previously noted. In this respect, as our authors conclude, the
development of Zhejiang’s local industrial clusters was driven forward “not
only by technological products and processes, but also by the institution-
alisation of their modes of management and organisation,” which were con-
structed locally as close as could be to the spaces that were ultimately being
administered. (52) The local systems therefore played a decisive role in this
area, in the diverse and varied forms that they could take. This links in with
the conclusions drawn in other works recently published by other econo-
mists in Zhejiang and Jiangsu, showing how the development of the com-
panies studied there between 2006 and 2009 took place largely through
endogenous local channels, and the importance of therefore considering
this form of “bottom-up capitalism” that is taking root if we are to grasp
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the transformations currently taking place in China. (53) In order to under-
stand this phenomenon, it would be useful to further explore comparisons
with the observations made not only in other parts of China, but also with
the evolution of other clusters observed in Europe, in Emilia-Romagna or
Bade-Wurtemberg, as has, on occasion, been initiated. (54) However, that
would take us too far from our subject.
What is striking from the Yongkang case is how the local organisation of
the area at no point lost flexibility, and how the predominantly local mode
of operation adopted when establishing the cluster in no way prevented
the city from opening up during the subsequent period to other, broader
forms of operation. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting how, in the highly rigid institutional
context that seems to characterise China, the flexibility of Zhejiang’s
industrial clusters, in terms of institutional adaptation, is not surprising.
Indeed, this flexibility has taken root in what could be seen as a deep-
rooted culture of compromise. At the heart of this is the practise of al-
most never directly challenging the stated general political principles or
colliding head-on with institutions, instead circumventing difficulties in
order to produce a de facto – and initially, almost surreptitious – ac-
ceptance of the obvious and the benefit of adopting new practices. The
watchword of this culture is adaptability, which is capable – by means
of many adjustments – of modifying situations from the inside in order
to win the adoption of rules that can be quite contradictory, as can be
seen in various consecutively stated principles of local governance –
from “cut off the capitalist tails” to “stimulating industry through trade
and developing industry together with trade” (yi shangcugong, gongmao
liandong) via the “four wheels (the local political and economic institu-
tions) turning together” (sige lunzi yiqi zhuan) – always without direct
conflict, especially political, and with care being taken to avoid loss of
face. The system therefore functions somehow according to a mode of
ex-post social recognition, avoiding “open crises,” (55) but capable on the
other hand of establishing – as we have seen here in the development
of the industrial clusters – a dynamic of adaptation that is as powerful
as it is constant.
Is this not one of the particularities of the forms of evolution of the current
Chinese regime, in the context of the “socialist market economy” that it in-
tends to promote and govern, while continuing to hold the political reins? (56)
This is certainly not a point that we feel should be ignored if one is to un-
derstand the Chinese economy’s speed of growth and ability to adapt, and
when taking stock of its developments and ambitions. Indeed, is it not the
very same type of cluster from Zhejiang, as observed and established in
Yongkang or Wenzhou, that can now be found, with its own features in Cape
Town, South Africa, (57) or Prato, Italy, (58) where it has even supplanted the
former highly symbolic model of Italian industrial districts? 
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